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WHITHER HAITI?

Donald E. Schulz

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WHITHER HAITI?

Donald E. Schulz

April 1, 1996

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FOREWORD

As this study goes to press, the U.N. Mission in Haiti is in the process of being extended for 4 months. The size of the force will be sharply reduced. The central role played thus far by the United States will be assumed by Canada, which, along with Argentina, Pakistan and Bangladesh, will provide some 1,900 troops to the operation. The question that all this poses is whether the progress that Haiti has made these past 18 months will continue, especially after the mission pulls out altogether (presumably after June 1996).

In the following report, Dr. Donald E. Schulz looks at the prospects for political stability, democratization, and socioeconomic development. His conclusions are sobering. While by no means dismissing the possibility that Haiti can "make it," he presents a portrait of the imposing obstacles that must still be overcome and a detailed discussion of the things that could go wrong. In a nutshell, he argues that without a much greater willingness on the part of the United States and the international community to "stay the course" in terms of providing long-term security and socioeconomic aid, Haiti is unlikely to make a successful transition to a stable, democratic, economically modernizing nation. (Even with continuing assistance, the outlook will be problematic.) He argues that unless the United States and other foreign donors recognize this and do what is necessary to give the Haitian experiment a better chance to succeed, the "tactical success" that has been enjoyed so far will sooner or later be transformed into a "strategic failure." His policy recommendations, in particular, deserve close scrutiny.

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to publish this report as a contribution to understanding events in this important country.


RICHARD H. WITHERSPOON
Colonel, U.S. Army
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DONALD E. SCHULZ is a Professor of National Security Affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College. He is the coauthor of *Reconciling the Irreconcilable: The Troubled Outlook for U.S. Policy Toward Haiti* and *The United States, Honduras and the Crisis in Central America* and coeditor of *Revolution and Counterrevolution in Central America and the Caribbean; Cuba and the Future; Political Participation in Communist Systems*; and *Mexico Faces the 21st Century*. His articles have appeared in *Foreign Policy*, *Orbis*, the *Journal of Inter-American Studies* and *World Affairs*, and *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, as well as such media outlets as *Newsweek*, *The Washington Post*, the *Miami Herald*, and the *Christian Science Monitor*.

SUMMARY

This study examines Haiti's prospects for political stability, democracy, and socioeconomic development after the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) leaves the country (presumably in 1996). Among the major conclusions are the following:

On the Transformation of the Haitian Political Culture.

- In Haiti, a political culture of predation has fostered autocracy and corruption, extreme social injustice, and economic stagnation. Since the September 1994 U.S. intervention, tangible progress has been made toward uprooting that culture. For the most part, the past 18 months have been marked by political stability and a sharp reduction of violence. The central institution of the Predatory State—the military—has been dismantled, and new a Haitian National Police (HNP) created. The relative lack of large-scale revenge-motivated violence has been especially encouraging, as has been an extraordinary flowering of political participation. At the same time, presidential, parliamentary and municipal elections have been held. For the first time in the country's history, the presidency has been transferred from one democratically elected president to another.
- This being said, other signs are not so positive. The June 1995 legislative and municipal elections were chaotic, and the months since have witnessed growing turmoil. There were major riots in November. For a while, moreover, there was doubt as to whether Aristide would step down and hold presidential elections. There has also been a series of political assassinations aimed at both Aristide's followers and

supporters of the former military regime, and there is some evidence of Haitian government involvement in the latter. In addition, there are disturbing signs that the Haitian police are reverting to the human rights abuses and incompetence that characterized their predecessors. Social violence—particularly in slums like Cite Soleil, where criminal gangs are increasingly dominant—is growing, and the HNP gives little indication of being able to cope with it. There is concern, too, about the government's decision to absorb hundreds of ex-military personnel into the police, some in command positions. As a result, the HNP has lost much of the legitimacy it enjoyed at its inception.

- There is a danger that severe constraints on Haiti's economic development may fatally undermine the country's political development. Socioeconomic conditions are extremely grim and likely to remain so for some time. Under such circumstances, there may well be a disillusionment with democracy.
- One of the main reasons that Haiti has been able to avoid major violence has been the presence of a substantial international peacekeeping force. Now, however, the UNMIH is downsizing and phasing out. If the violence that Haiti has been experiencing should increase and become more politicized, it would further undermine the prospects for political stability and democratization.
- The transformation of a political culture requires the internalization of new values and attitudes. But such changes will take years—indeed decades—to complete. Education will be critical. While Aristide has begun this process, it is by no means clear that his successor, Rene Preval, will be able to hold together the centrifugal forces that will continue to pull at Haiti's delicate political fabric.

- The legitimacy of Haiti's political institutions—especially at the national level—remains very weak. Haitians are used to thinking of the state as an oppressive force, and it will take time and a radically different pattern of government behavior to change that. Political parties are still highly unstable, little more than vehicles for the ambitions of individual politicians. The police and the courts remain extremely fragile. Weak and/or illegitimate institutions are not likely to perform the functions for which they are designed. Failing that, they will remain susceptible to political subversion, corruption, and destruction. Whether Aristide's charismatic authority will be supplanted by institutional authority remains one of the key issues in Haitian political development.
- In sum, gains have been made, but there are still enormous obstacles to overcome. Moreover, there are growing signs that the situation is deteriorating—this at precisely the time that U.S. and U.N. peacekeepers are leaving.

On the Role of the United States and the International Community.

- Haiti's future will in no small part depend on the willingness and ability of the international community—especially the United States—to use its resources to promote Haitian political and socioeconomic development. There are serious doubts, however, as to whether the country's foreign sponsors are willing to make the kind of investment that is necessary.
- U.S. policy toward Haiti has been both driven and constrained by domestic politics. Political support in Congress and the public for the September 1994 military intervention and the peacekeeping operations that followed was extraordinarily thin and

was conditioned on being able to move in, restore order and move out, while keeping U.S. casualties to an absolute minimum. This structured serious limitations and irrationalities into the policy that now threaten the success of the entire operation. Cases in point include the failure to more aggressively disarm those elements that were capable of threatening public order, and the insistence that Aristide step down, even though he had been deprived of 3 years of his presidency and had the support of most Haitians to continue in office for 3 more years to make up for the time that had been lost. The consequence is likely to be a Haiti that will be more unstable—and potentially anti-American—than it had to be.

- There is a danger that the United States and other foreign aid donors/lenders, by attempting to impose neoliberal economic reforms on Haiti and suspending aid when it resisted, may push the country into an even deeper socioeconomic crisis. If that occurs, political stability and democracy will probably be among the casualties.

Conclusions and Recommendations.

- While nothing is inevitable, there is a very real danger that sooner or later the situation will fall apart and Haiti will return to its traditional pattern of dictatorship and chaos. Five scenarios are presented to give the reader an idea of the kinds of things that could go wrong. It is argued that the United States and the United Nations need to be sensitized to these potential developments and devise a long-range plan to avoid them. Otherwise, the tactical success that has been enjoyed so far will likely turn into a strategic failure.
- The most obvious requirement is for a continuing international peacekeeping presence. This will be needed for at least another year, with a smaller

presence probably necessary for several more years—i.e., until the HNP is firmly on its feet and a competent judicial system is in place. In addition, a rapid response force should be formed to back up the Haitian government, as required. There should be U.S. participation in all these operations to bolster their credibility.

- At the same time, there must be ongoing foreign support for the Haitian police, including the provision of training and hands-on monitoring and backup in the field. The HNP needs more of everything—more police, weapons, vehicles and other equipment, and especially more vetting. Unvetted ex-military should not be taken into the force, and in general the number of former army personnel should be minimized. (Their presence reduces the legitimacy of the institution and is likely to create problems of control.) Officers who abuse their power must be held accountable. There must be ongoing efforts at professionalization, with an emphasis on respect for constitutionally sanctioned authority and human rights.
- Of more immediate concern than a coup is the danger that new and more potent weapons might be used irresponsibly or fall into the wrong hands. While the HNP will need heavier arms to deal with emergency situations, these should be closely controlled and limited to specially trained backup units. The general model of policing that should be followed should be based on the cultivation of police-community relations, with the use of firearms a last resort.
- The Preval administration should accelerate the reform process. The system of centralized state controls that has traditionally sucked resources out of the countryside for the benefit of Port-au-Prince must be dismantled. The peasantry must receive a fair share of the economic pie. Moreover, the stalemate must be broken on privatization, civil service reform, and transparency in the use of public funds.

- President Preval and ex-President Aristide must continue to cooperate with one another. Without the latter's support, the new President may not be able to govern. By the same token, should the country come apart over the next 5 years there may not be any pieces for Aristide to pick up when he reassumes office (which he presumably will) in 2001.
- Though President Preval comes from the populist wing of *Lavalas*, he may be more pragmatic than Aristide. International lenders and donors would be well advised to work with him to find mutually acceptable solutions to Haiti's problems, rather than trying to impose preconceived economic policies on Haiti.
- In this U.S. election year, both Democrats and Republicans should avoid turning Haiti into a political football, lest the consequences be disastrous.
- The central lesson of the recent U.S. experience with Haiti is that half-way efforts lead to half-way, ineffective, and sometimes counterproductive results. The danger facing the United States and the international community is that they will have raised Haitian expectations only to dash them through an unwillingness to do what is necessary to give the democratic experiment a real chance of success. If the current deadlock over privatization and foreign aid is allowed to continue, it will lead to further socioeconomic decline. That, in turn, will feed the nationalistic backlash that has already begun, produce more political turmoil, and resurrect the Haitian migration problem.

WHITHER HAITI?

The institutions of Haiti are Jacobin and Voodoo, watered in blood under the Tree of Liberty. . . .

Robert and Nancy Heinl
Written in Blood

This report examines the prospects for political stability and democracy in Haiti within the context of what scholars have called the Predatory State. The Haitian state, it has been argued, traditionally has functioned as a parasitic force, siphoning off economic resources from the peasantry through draconian taxes and other means, enforcing its will through a multiplicity of controls, including the threat and use of force. In this sense one could speak of the State versus Society, with the military operating as both a repressive arm of the government and as a semiautonomous actor with interests of its own.¹

The question that this monograph poses is whether the restoration of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide fundamentally has changed these realities. It has been suggested that the one major, concrete change that Aristide made during his "second coming" was the abolition of the armed forces (*Forces Armees d'Haiti*, or FAdH). Haiti, it is said, is passing through a watershed. The old institutions of repression have been dismantled. New democratic organizations—including an apolitical, professional police force—are being created, which will fundamentally transform the nature of state-society relations.

As important as the abolition of the military is, this writer will argue that the above view seriously underestimates the obstacles to change. The current situation in Haiti is an artificial one. Order is being maintained by U.N./U.S. peacekeepers, while Haitian police are being trained to assume that duty when the foreigners leave. But the danger is that, once the U.N. exits, Haiti may

fall apart. This might occur fairly quickly or it might be gradual, but sooner or later it is likely. The bottom line is that there is a structure of violence undercutting the Haitian socioeconomic and political order that has only been partially uprooted. Until much more progress has been made in eliminating those conditions, democracy and political stability will be very "iffy" propositions.

A Dysfunctional Political Culture.

One of the themes of this monograph is that political beliefs, values, attitudes, and behavior—in a word, political culture—matter. Among political scientists, this is virtually taken as a given.² Among Haitians and those who study Haiti, however, it is a hotly contested issue. There is a tendency to regard cultural explanations for Haiti's political and economic underdevelopment as insulting (some would say racist), and sometimes they can be. Still, unless one is willing to argue that beliefs, values, attitudes and behavior are unimportant, one is forced to take them seriously.

To say this is to imply neither that cultures are monolithic nor immutable, much less the product of some congenital disease that defies rational explanation. On the contrary, they are the product of socialization and experience, which to one extent or another differ from person to person and group to group. The political culture of elites may be expected to be significantly different from the political culture of the masses. (Precisely how is a question for empirical research.) If the political relationships between classes change, the dominant political culture may also change. Or, at least, a window of opportunity will open. Whether Haitians will be able to take advantage of that opportunity is one of the most crucial issues facing the country today.

The road will not be easy. In Haiti, a deeply embedded culture of predation has fostered autocracy and corruption, extreme social injustice, and economic stagnation. In this sense, the Duvaliers and Duvalierism are not aberrations, but rather the culmination of a particular set of historical

experiences, including those provided by traditional African culture, slavery, a bloody war of liberation, the reimposition of relations of elite dominance and mass submission, chronic cycles of tyranny and chaos, and the effects of a prolonged U.S. occupation. The upshot has been the development of an elaborate syndrome of destructive/self-destructive political behavior marked by authoritarianism, paternalism, personalism, patronage, nepotism, demagoguery, corruption, cynicism, opportunism, racism, incompetence, parasitism, rigidity, intolerance, rivalry, distrust, insecurity, vengeance, intrigue, superstition, volatility, violence, paranoia, xenophobia, exploitation, class hatred, institutional illegitimacy, and mass apathy, aversion and submission.

Space will not permit a detailed treatment of this syndrome, but that is not important. These and associated traits have been identified and commented on elsewhere;³ they are all too familiar to students of Haitian history and politics. What is more relevant for our purposes is a clear understanding of the constraints that they place on political and economic development.

Notwithstanding Aristide's return and the dissolution of the FAdH, Haiti's future is likely to depend, to a very considerable extent, on the same elites who have dominated its past.⁴ These are the elements that have the education, wealth and other resources that will be critical to pulling the country out of the quagmire of underdevelopment in which it has been (and continues to be) trapped. Yet, their past behavior provides scant basis for optimism. Predators do not change their habits overnight. Even today, the mulatto elite retains many of the values of the 18th century plantation owners. This is an aristocracy with no sense of *noblesse oblige*.⁵ Traditionally, its members have tended to view themselves as superior by dint of the color of their skin. They disdain manual labor and those who engage in it. In general, they are convinced that the masses are stupid: "The mildest expression of general opinion," according to James Leyburn, "is that it would be a waste of time to try to educate

[them], for they are so nearly like animals that they could not absorb even the simplest education.”⁶

Haiti’s black elites have not been any better. Duvalier père’s efforts to promote “*negritude*” only opened the door to upwardly aspiring predators with a different shade of skin who, once in positions of power, proved to be just as violent and corrupt as their predecessors. Indeed, under “Papa Doc,” terror became a way of life. Nor was there any effort to improve the economic lot of the masses, or educate them so that they might better themselves in the future. The culture of predation did not allow for such sentiment. The only “development” that was held to be desirable was that which benefited the country’s political and economic elites.

Beyond this, there is the question of whether Haiti is really a nation at all. The evidence suggests that it is not—or, at least, that its nationhood is severely underdeveloped. Haiti lacks a true sense of community, a feeling of shared values and common interests sufficient to overcome the differences that divide people from one another. Thus, urban elites have always considered peasants the *moun andeyo*, the people on the outside. Nor has this sense of estrangement been limited to class relationships. As Robert Rotberg has observed, mistrust has been the traditional “response of Haitians of all classes to all other Haitians.”⁷ Peasants distrusted other peasants and pursued a “dog-eat-dog” (*chin manje chin*) existence.⁸ Until fairly recently, moreover, “to call a peasant a Haitian was to insult him grossly; a man had very specific ties to a locale, and no supralocal or national links to which he gave real credence.”⁹

What all this has meant historically is that politics has been a zero-sum game: the winner takes all. In further consequence, power, when it has not been used to simply accumulate more power and spoils, has largely been a negative phenomenon: it has been the power to obstruct or destroy rather than create. At the national level, at least, Haitians have had extraordinary difficulty in cooperating for programmatic ends. In the words of Anthony Maingot, they “can never fight the large wars (against poverty or

gross injustice); instead, they are geared only toward fighting the next political battles."¹⁰

To overcome this legacy and remain on the path of peaceful democratic evolution will require nothing less than a cultural revolution, and it is precisely this that, under Aristide's leadership, is being attempted. Since his return, Aristide has expended much time and energy promoting national reconciliation and democracy. He has wooed the bourgeoisie in an attempt to enlist its cooperation in his efforts to promote economic development. At the same time, he has pleaded with his followers to forego vengeance in favor of the justice that will hopefully be attained with the establishment of a renovated judicial system. In effect, the (now former) President is trying to create a social contract between State and Society where one has never really existed. To this end, he has sought to educate the populace about the importance of democracy and has encouraged the construction of new democratic institutions that would bring the *moun andeyo* into the political process and replace the traditionally one-sided and exploitative state-society relationship with one based on government responsiveness and accountability to the masses.

To what extent has he succeeded, and what are the prospects for the future? To raise once again the question posed by Robert Rotberg at the recent Mayagüez conference¹¹ on Haiti: Is Maingot's observation still true? Or have Haitians finally learned to work together to fight the "larger wars" against poverty and injustice?

While it is much too early to render any definitive judgments, there are some signs that the political culture is indeed changing. The relative lack of large-scale, revenge-motivated violence is encouraging. Furthermore, the extraordinary renaissance that is occurring in grass-roots organizing and the spillover of these activities into the political arena at all levels suggest that new patterns of political participation and recruitment have emerged. These grass-roots efforts are the continuation of a process that began well before Aristide came to the presidency, but that was interrupted during the Cedras

years when all such activities were suppressed. This resurrection has been accompanied by a potentially important shift in political attitudes and behavior: Whereas previously local leaders shunned conventional politics and institutions and tried to bring about change from outside the system, today they are increasingly moving into the political system, joining parties, running for office, and serving in the executive branch as well as Congress and municipal government. One anticipates that their presence may inject a much greater degree of responsiveness and accountability into Haitian political institutions.¹²

This being said, other signs are not so favorable. The June 1995 legislative and municipal elections were a near-disaster. Marred by an unresponsive and incompetent Provisional Elections Council (CEP), by organizational chaos, some fraud and occasional violence, the balloting undercut the legitimacy of the Haitian government and the nascent democratic experiment. And the government's slowness in dealing with the opposition's legitimate complaints only made matters worse. Most of the opposition parties repudiated the vote and refused to participate in the subsequent makeup and runoff elections. (Though most candidates ran anyway.) The result was an overwhelming *Lavalas* victory.¹³

In short, Haitians still, apparently, could not put aside their petty power struggles in the national interest. In perspective, the elections represented a return to the zero-sum politics of the past. In the months that followed, moreover, there were other indications that all was not right. These weeks witnessed an upsurge in political violence. Death squad activities increased. Most of this was aimed at people associated with the Cedras regime or the FAdH, but this was not always the case: In early November, Jean-Hubert Feuille, a newly elected legislator, cousin and former bodyguard of the President, was gunned down in what was widely presumed to be a political assassination. At his funeral, an emotionally distraught Aristide ordered the police to disarm the *macoutes* and their sponsors, and he called on his supporters to help them. ("Go to the

neighborhoods where there are big houses and heavy weapons.”¹⁴) There followed an outbreak of rioting that left at least 10 people dead and over a score wounded. Dozens of Aristide’s foes had their homes torched or looted. A radio station critical of the President was attacked. Vigilantes erected roadblocks, burned tires, and searched vehicles. In Gonaïves, U.N. soldiers were attacked by an angry mob.

Meanwhile, in spite of a long-standing pledge to step down from office at the end of his term, Aristide did little to dissuade his supporters from launching a campaign to extend his stay. Indeed, at times he seemed to openly encourage them. In late November, before a “national dialogue” conference that had passed resolutions calling for a term extension, he proclaimed that “if you want three [more] years, I will not ignore you.” He promised to present the resolutions at a cabinet meeting the following week.¹⁵

These were disturbing developments. Aristide’s political foes interpreted them as a prelude to the cancellation of the election—or, at least, as an attempt to create a climate of intimidation that would render the balloting meaningless. (Some were threatened or attacked by *Lavalas* partisans.) Subsequently Aristide, under heavy pressure from the United States and the international community, reiterated his pledge to follow through with the elections as scheduled, but by then much damage had been done.

Whether one interprets Aristide’s behavior as a calculated attempt to test the United States and the international community to see how far he could go or an effort to contain internal schisms within *Lavalas* and prevent violence,¹⁶ the net result was disastrous: U.S.-Haitian relations were badly damaged. Anti-American feeling increased, as the President’s followers blamed Washington for forcing Haiti’s “savior” from office. U.S. observers—both critics and supporters of the Clinton administration’s policy—had their worst fears reinforced. CIA claims about Aristide’s lack of stability, which had been largely discredited, regained plausibility. Within Haiti, moreover, frightened members of the bourgeoisie began to leave the country or, at least, shelved any plans they might

have had to invest in it. (As did foreign investors.) The upshot was that much of the good work that had been done on behalf of national reconciliation was undone. The formidable task of reconstructing Haiti was made even harder.

In all fairness, one should also say that the issues were not quite as clear-cut as Aristide's critics have claimed: He had, after all, been robbed of 3 years in office, and there was little doubt that most Haitians wanted him to stay. If his departure fulfilled the letter of the constitution, it nevertheless seemed to violate the *spirit* of democracy, not to mention fairness. In effect, it constituted a partial ratification of the coup of September 1991.

Still, given Haiti's history and the deep-seated conflicts that continued to plague it, one had to be nervous about these developments. Aristide's behavior did not inspire confidence in his intentions. A term extension might have set a dangerous precedent. Even if Aristide himself was committed to democracy (and not everyone was convinced of this), one could not be so sanguine about his followers. Some, clearly, hungered after more monumental revolutionary changes. Others were opportunists out for their own personal gain. The potential for corruption and the abuse of power was enormous, and only time would tell whether *Lavalasians* would be able to withstand the temptations.

Several other related points must be made. One concerns mass political culture. My comments thus far have been primarily directed at the political culture of elites, but one must also factor in the values, attitudes and behavior of ordinary Haitians. Earlier, it was suggested that there were likely to be differences between the two, and that the displacement of the old ruling class might open a window of opportunity for fundamental change. One must temper this optimism, however, with an appreciation that the masses are likely to share many of the same propensities towards authoritarianism, class hatred, and so on that have marked the behavior of their exploiters.¹⁷ The danger of revolutionary transformation is that the new ruling class (and

(and specifically its leaders) may become just as corrupt and brutal as the one it replaced.

Second, at this stage at least the Haitian “revolution” is not really a revolution at all. Rather, there has been only a partial displacement of the old ruling class. What remains is civil society, an entity which, as Robert Fatton has pointed out, is not always civil and is full of contradictions: “Rather than constituting a coherent social project, Haitian civil society tends to embody a disorganized plurality of mutually exclusive projects that are not necessarily democratic.” Within this uneasy conglomerate are neo-Duvalierists and neo-liberals as well as moderate and radical *Lavalasians*, all “competing for state power and involved in continuous struggles, negotiations, and compromises.”¹⁸ The outcome is less likely to be a definitive victory for any one class or sector than a “soup” reflecting different political subcultures and interests. In short, the break with the past will not be clean.

Third, severe constraints on Haiti’s economic development may well fatally undermine the country’s political development. Part of the popular appeal of democracy lies in the expectation that it will lead to an improvement in people’s well-being. But democracy makes no such guarantees; moreover, the neoliberal economic package being imposed on the government will likely prolong the current socioeconomic hardship. Whether this is justified in the long run is subject to debate, but in the shorter term a failure to substantially improve living conditions may lead to a disillusionment with democracy.

Fourth, if the violence that Haiti has been experiencing in recent months should increase and become more politicized, it will further undermine the prospects for democratization. If democracy cannot provide people with security, it will be discredited.

Fifth, the transformation of a political culture requires the internalization of new values and attitudes; a superficial embrace is not enough. But such profound changes will take years—indeed decades—to complete. And they are much more

than the product of a single wise leader. Education will be critical. Aristide has begun the process of democratization, but his term of office has now ended. Who is there of comparable stature and commitment to carry on the task? Even if he remains a major actor on the political scene—as most people believe he will—can he hold together the centrifugal forces that will continue to pull at Haiti's delicate political fabric in the years ahead?

Finally, there is the problem of institutionalization. Notwithstanding Aristide's popularity, the legitimacy and durability of Haitian political institutions remain very much in doubt. There is a general lack of understanding of the role and functioning of institutions in a democracy. Haitians are accustomed to thinking of the state as a bully—the Creole word *leta* has both meanings—and it will take time and a radically different pattern of government behavior to change that. At the same time, political parties are still little more than vehicles for the personal ambitions of various politicians. These are highly unstable (one might even say ephemeral) organizations. (In this respect, *Lavalas* is no exception.)¹⁹ In spite of the positive attitudinal and behavioral shifts noted earlier, most Haitians still view politics with considerable cynicism and distrust. Only when the country's political leaders and parties prove their worth by developing concrete platforms and policies to deal with Haiti's problems, are further inroads likely to be made against this deep-seated alienation.

Much the same could be said about Haiti's police and judicial institutions, and they will be addressed later. The point here is that weak and illegitimate institutions are not likely to perform effectively the functions for which they were designed. Failing that, they will remain fragile, susceptible to political subversion, corruption and destruction. While some progress has been made in developing new or renovated institutions since September 1994, there are still light years to go. If Haitians are no longer as politically alienated as they once were, this is more the product of their faith in Aristide than anything. To many, he is still a messiah—a savior rather than a politician.

But whether his charismatic authority will be supplanted by institutional legitimacy in the years ahead remains very much in doubt.

[Note: On December 17, 1995, the Haitian presidential election was held. Aristide's hand-picked candidate, Rene Preval, won 87.9 percent of the vote in a contest that was remarkably free from violence and irregularities. The downside was that voter turnout was very low, only 28 percent.²⁰ On February 7th, in the first peaceful succession of one democratically elected president by another in Haiti's turbulent history, Preval assumed office.]

The Economic Substructure of Violence.

Behind the values, attitudes, beliefs and behavior that foster political violence, there are also stark economic needs and relationships. While the military-institutional bases of violence have been destroyed, the economic substructure remains largely intact. The critical issues here, both for democracy and political stability, are poverty, inequality, economic growth, and class conflict.

Haiti has long been the poorest country in the hemisphere and one of the poorest in the world, but in recent years its rate of impoverishment has dramatically worsened. Three years of terror, plunder, neglect and international sanctions have reduced the per capita income to around \$250-260.²¹ To make matters worse, the wealth of the country continues to be concentrated in the hands of a relatively small number of people—MREs or Morally Repugnant Elites, a U.S. diplomat once called them—who have traditionally profited by monopolies, a grossly unfair system of taxation and other mechanisms designed to benefit them at the expense of the vast majority of Haitians. Unless these realities change, there is likely to be violence. There has been in the past, and there will be in the future. The only way that the system can be maintained is by repression.

That, indeed, was the function of the Haitian armed forces. Typically, the only state entities regularly present in

the countryside were the tax office and the military barracks or post—the one to extract and the other to enforce the one-way flow of resources from rural areas to Port-au-Prince.²² Over time, the FAdH itself became a major economic institution. In the words of Michel Laguerre, the professional soldier was also an “entrepreneur—kleptocratic, parasitic, and competitive.” Haitian officers owned businesses and sold their services. Some operated, in effect, as godfathers, maneuvering indirectly behind the scenes to promote economic dealings through intermediaries.²³ Out in the countryside, 565 rural section chiefs operated as virtual feudal lords. They had their own private militias, imposed fines, collected taxes and bribes, dragooned peasants and workers to labor on their farms, and, in general, served as judge, jury and executioner in their areas of jurisdiction. At the bottom of this “food chain” of violence were the *lumpen* elements who served as the primary instruments of the terror: rank-and-file soldiers and paramilitary *attaches*, many of whom doubled as police or army regulars, who were so poorly paid (or who had to pay to obtain their jobs in the first place) that their only recourse was to use their weapons to shake-down ordinary citizens for whatever they could get.²⁴

Under the generalized corruption of the regime led by LTG Raoul Cedras, BG Philippe Biamby, and LTC Joseph Michel François, military officers appropriated an increasingly large share of the country’s wealth. The armed forces received about 40 percent of the national budget and controlled many state-owned enterprises. The public sector was especially infiltrated by the proxies of the Port-au-Prince police chief, François, who controlled the telephone company, the port, the electricity company and some basic imports. Narcotrafficking and contraband operations became widespread. The former alone brought in tens of millions of dollars a year, and this bonanza was by no means restricted to the high command. By 1993, discipline had so disintegrated that officers down to the rank of captain had become economic powers in their own right.²⁵

During these years, the "merchant-bourgeois" and landowning (*gwandon*) sectors of the elite steadfastly supported the dictatorship and opposed Aristide's return. Powerful military-business alliances dominated much of the country's economic activities, controlling the import of Haiti's four main staples: flour, cement, sugar and oil. Within the merchant-bourgeois group, three rival conglomerates—basically run by the Mevs, Brandt and Bigio families—competed with one another, with other influential families and businessmen, and with more moderate technocratic-managerial elites associated with the assembly industries, for political influence, oligopsonistic market control, and other opportunities for profit. Some of these leaders had close ties with high-ranking members of the regime. Colonel François, for instance, was on the Mevs' payroll; Cedras was allied with the Brandts.²⁶

Today, the military institution is gone, but the oligarchy remains. The prospects for economic development and a substantive improvement in living conditions are problematic. Nor does the redistribution of economic power in favor of the poor majority seem to be in the cards. Though Sidney Mintz, in his recent *Foreign Affairs* article, argued that hardly any beneficial long-term political changes could be accomplished without such a redistribution,²⁷ this is an explosive issue. More than any other single factor, it was the threat of class warfare that led to the coup that overthrew Aristide in September 1991. A resurrection of that specter would repolarize Haiti, risk more violence, and frighten away investors. Furthermore, the neoliberal economic policies being imposed on the Haitian government by international donors would seem, on the surface, to preclude such a strategy. Haiti utterly depends on foreign aid, and as long as that is the case its options will be severely constrained. The price of defiance would be very high.

For 200 years, Haiti has been locked into a process of de-development. Peasant productivity today is less than it was in 1843.²⁸ The agricultural technology that prevailed during the last decades of colonial rule was arguably superior to that which is used at present.²⁹ Even if one takes

the optimistic view that the primary obstacle to economic development—the Predatory State—is no more, the challenges are enormous. The only sector of the economy to show any promise over the past couple of decades—assembly manufacturing for export—lies in ruin, a casualty of military repression and international sanctions. Even if it can be restored, it will not produce more than a small percentage of the jobs that are needed to absorb the rapidly expanding work force, and these would be at a pitifully low wage.³⁰ At the same time, Haiti lacks the human capital to make a rapid transition to high-growth, more advanced-technology industries. In the countryside, the peasantry remains trapped in a descending spiral of rapid population growth and accelerating soil erosion that increasingly threatens the very basis of its existence.³¹

In short, the task in Haiti is less one of economic “recovery” or “restoration” than starting from scratch. There is very little to build on. There are few functioning institutions, little human capital and a long history of waste and corruption. Lest it be forgotten, the Haitian private sector has been no less predatory than the state. In general, these are not free marketeers. The economic elites have never been that interested in investing in Haiti under competitive conditions, and they are reluctant to face more efficient foreign competitors. Even now, some of the most powerful families oppose privatization and continue to make huge profits by controlling the import of flour, cement, generators and other key items.³² Given Haiti’s violent past and uncertain future—the current debate over privatization is nothing short of vitriolic—few are rushing to invest. In the words of one official: “No one in Haiti is going to invest in any substantial way for ten years; they are afraid they will lose their money.”³³

Nor is the outlook for foreign private investment much better. So far, at least, virtually none has come into the country.³⁴ While this is partly a result of the Haitian government’s slowness in instituting privatization and other free-market reforms, the security issue is equally important. If foreigners are not investing now, when the

United States and the United Nations have thousands of troops maintaining order, what can be expected once those forces leave, and security becomes much more problematic?

Lacking investment, Haiti will need foreign aid, and a lot of it. To date, international donors have pledged some \$1.8 billion for the Haiti Economic Recovery Program over a 5-year period, but the results thus far have been disappointing. While Haiti's real Gross Domestic Product in 1995 grew by about 3.5 percent and inflation was cut by more than half, these gains were not as impressive as they might seem at first glance.³⁵ The economy, after all, no longer has to operate under conditions of military repression/plunder and international embargo, and large amounts of foreign aid have been poured into the country. Moreover, development assistance has been slow in coming. Until last summer, at least, most of the disbursements went to debt payments, oil purchases, and government payrolls. Only in the last half year or so have some infrastructure projects—e.g., power supplies and roads—begun to make visible improvements. Even so, unemployment rates remain astronomical (perhaps as high as 80 percent), and power shortages and high prices for food, gas and other basic commodities persist.³⁶ Consequently, living standards have improved hardly at all, and popular frustration and disillusionment are growing.

In perspective, much more will be needed than \$1.8 billion and over a much longer period of time. One cannot reverse 200 years of misdevelopment in 5 years. One must think in terms of decades. Yet, there is no reason to believe that the international community is willing to make that kind of an investment. Indeed, the United States is already beginning to downsize its commitment. After pumping \$235 million into the Haitian economy in 1995, the Clinton administration reduced its aid request for 1996 by more than half to \$115 million. Given the recent deterioration in U.S.-Haitian relations and the current mood in Congress, it may not even get that.³⁷ At this writing, some \$200 million is being withheld by the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, United States, and other foreign lenders

because of Aristide's failure to follow through on his pledges of privatization. Unless that dispute is resolved, the outlook for further aid—and for economic recovery—will be very bleak. These suspensions have already had a negative socioeconomic impact in Haiti, where inflation is once again rising and the government is running out of money.³⁸

But beyond this immediate issue, there is the question of whether the United States and the international community will stay the course. If they do not, the results will be predictable: Once the foreigners leave, their development projects will be left to decay. One recalls the fate of the all-weather roads the Americans left after their first occupation: In 1934, Haiti had 1,200 miles of well-constructed highway; in 1971, she could claim only 300 miles of surfaced all-weather roadways, including city streets.³⁹

In sum, the Haitian government is trapped. On the one hand, it must please foreign donors or risk losing the aid it needs to jump start the economy and avoid a further sharp decline in living conditions. On the other, it must satisfy the aspirations of the poor majority of Haitians for a better life. Unfortunately, whatever its purely economic merit, the USAID/World Bank/IMF prescription will almost certainly lead to more hardship in the short run, and probably a lot longer than that. To the extent that the government bureaucracy is streamlined and state enterprises privatized, for instance, this will contribute to greater unemployment. As in the case of such experiments elsewhere, there will be an increase in inequality.⁴⁰ All this is likely to produce more social and political conflict, undermine the legitimacy of both the government and the democratic experiment, and make an economic take-off even more problematic.

The bottom line is that there is little chance of a significant improvement in Haitian living standards in the short run, and things could very well get worse. As a result, one should expect growing frustration and probably rising violence. While most of the latter will take the form of common crime, some will be political. There will continue to

be a large pool of unemployed Haitians willing and able to hire themselves out as gunmen. Most of the *attaches* were never disarmed, and only a fraction of the weapons in Haiti were ever confiscated or turned in.⁴¹ Thus the rationale for providing ex-soldiers with job training so that they will not resort to violence to make a living or attempt to destabilize the government. But the catch is that not everyone can be retrained. There are currently tens of thousands of former *attaches* who are not included in the program. And beyond this, there are serious doubts about how many jobs will be available for those who do receive training. Opportunities for employment are scarce, and the Haitian government is understandably reluctant to give its enemies preferential treatment over its own followers. In the words of one Haitian official: "We have not seen any concrete results of the USAID job creation program, and the Haitian government is not going to create jobs for these people, so after training they will end up on the streets."⁴²

Finally, one of the problems with creating a Haitian National Police that is almost as large as the old FAdH is that there may not be enough money to pay all these people. Salary levels have been set very high by Haitian standards (about U.S. \$330 a month) so that officers will not have to resort to corruption to make a living. But there is serious concern that the government may not be able to meet the payroll in coming years. Already, there have been delays in payment. Whether the international community will provide the necessary financial support and for how long remains to be seen. (U.S. officials say that the police assistance and training program will not pay salaries.⁴³) Again, this brings us back to one of the primary economic roots of thuggery: If the police cannot make a living by being police, they will supplement their incomes by extortion, theft or selling their services to the highest bidder. Will Haiti's past also be Haiti's future?

Reconciliation with Justice: A Contradiction in Terms?

Robert and Nancy Heinl once wrote that "deep in the psyche of Haiti . . . lies a violence that goes beyond violence." That this is so may be shown by five centuries of history "dominated at every turn by death and terror."⁴⁴ The question is whether this self-destructive pattern can be broken. Can Haiti finally achieve national reconciliation and justice? Or will it once again slip into a fratricidal cycle of revenge and retaliation?

That the country has avoided such conflict thus far has been largely due to the international military/police presence and the efforts of President Aristide to promote reconciliation between Haitians of all social classes. Yet, this reconciliation remains extremely fragile; moreover, it has been purchased in part at the expense of justice. The Carter-Cedras agreement providing for the September 1994 "intervasion" enabled the top leaders of the old regime to escape the country.⁴⁵ Though the U.S.-led Multinational Force arrested hundreds of alleged criminals and human rights abusers, only 26 were turned over to the Haitian government in January 1995. The rest had been released for lack of evidence or because there was no functioning judiciary or had been permitted to "escape" by sympathetic prison officials. At the same time, notorious offenders like Franck Romain, the former Duvalierist mayor of Port-au-Prince, and Emmanuel Constant,⁴⁶ the founder of the paramilitary group FRAPH, were allowed to remain at large or quietly slip into the Dominican Republic. The upshot was growing disillusionment with U.S. and U.N. peacekeeping operations and official Haitian institutions and a tendency to exact "popular justice" in the streets.

As months passed and the Aristide government itself became increasingly the target of criticism, it began to move more aggressively on the justice issue. A National Commission of Truth and Justice was formed to investigate past human rights abuses. A number of people were arrested in connection with a 1987 peasant massacre at

Jean-Rabel. LTC François was tried *in absentia*, along with 16 co-defendants, for the murder of Aristide supporter Antoine Izmay. The question was how far the President would go. The list of human rights violators potentially subject to prosecution was very long.⁴⁷

Thus, in this respect also the Haitian government seems trapped. Caught between the Left, which wants an aggressive pursuit of justice, and the Right, which mortally fears such a development, it will have to perform a delicate balancing act. A failure to satisfy the former would undermine one of the government's traditional bases of support, while feeding an instinct for revenge that could very well lead to more political assassinations and mob violence. On the other hand, a too vigorous pursuit of justice might have the same effect, while so frightening the economic elite as to shatter its fragile support for (or tolerance of) the government and perhaps provoking a violent response from the Right. The rampage that followed Aristide's recent speech urging the disarmament of those thought to be responsible for the growing incidences of political assassination provides a cautionary example of how volatile the current situation remains and how easily violence from one side can trigger violence from the other.

The U.S./International Commitment: The Politics of Counterproductivity.

Haiti's future will in no small part depend on the willingness and ability of the international community—especially the United States—to use its resources to promote Haitian political and socioeconomic development. While foreigners cannot impose such changes on Haitians, they can help them to help themselves by fostering the human and material infrastructure and policies that would allow for the *possibility* of development. Put another way, major, sustained international aid is a necessary but not sufficient requisite for democratization and socioeconomic progress. Though it will not guarantee success, its absence will most assuredly lead to failure.

This being said, do the United States and the international community know how, are they willing to pay the price, and will they stay the course? There is reason for skepticism on all these counts. Certainly, the previous U.S. experience in Haiti (1915-34) offers scant reason for optimism; nor, in general, does the history of U.S. military and police training programs in Latin America. While technical skills are relatively easy to instill, it is much more difficult to transform political cultures. Democratic values and rational-legal norms have to be internalized, and this takes considerable time, practice, and a concerted effort at education. It also requires the alleviation of the socioeconomic conditions that breed authoritarianism and violence.

There are serious doubts as to whether Haiti's foreign benefactors are willing to make the kind of investment that is needed. Lest it be forgotten, Washington did not send troops into Haiti for the sake of Haiti. While not unimportant, the restoration of democracy and the protection of human rights were secondary considerations. What really appears to have triggered the intervention was a convergence of political pressures, all of which were at least in part domestic in nature. In ascending order of importance, these were: (1) the need to placate the Congressional Black Caucus and other interest groups and individuals associated with the liberal wing of the Democratic Party; (2) the need to defuse the Haitian and Cuban immigration crises;⁴⁸ and (3) the need to salvage the credibility of President Clinton and American foreign policy, which were in the process of being utterly shredded by the image of U.S. helplessness in the face of a defiant, fourth-rate dictatorship.

The question, of course, is what will happen now that these higher priority concerns have been (at least momentarily) satisfied. Will the commitments to democracy, human rights, and the socioeconomic betterment of Haiti be enough to sustain the U.S./international involvement?

Part of the problem is that U.S. policy towards Haiti has been and continues to be hostage to domestic politics. (In this respect, it resembles Washington's policy towards Cuba.) Political support in Congress and the public for the intervention and the peacekeeping operations that followed has been extraordinarily thin, and has been conditioned on being able to move in, restore order, and move out quickly, while keeping U.S. casualties to an absolute minimum. That hasn't left much room for maneuver. Indeed, it has structured serious constraints and irrationalities into policy that now threaten the success of the entire operation.

A case in point is disarmament. Future historians may well conclude that an effective disarmament program was crucial to Haiti's prospects for stability. But the desire to avoid "mission creep" that might lead to American casualties *à la* Somalia precluded such an undertaking. Thus, tens of thousands of weapons are still in circulation and potentially available for criminal and political activities. On the other hand, had the United States pursued the issue more aggressively and had there been U.S. deaths (which seemed likely at the time), political support for the occupation might have evaporated altogether, forcing an embarrassing and self-defeating pullout. The Clinton administration chose not to take that risk. As a result, the issue persists as a serious source of strain in Haiti's relations with the United States and the United Nations. (Disarmament has not been part of the mandate of the U.N. peacekeeping force.) As the Haitian political transition and the U.N. departure drew near, violence and insecurity continued to grow, fueled in part by the failure to disarm.⁴⁹

Another example: As this report is being completed, President Aristide has just stepped down from office. There is some danger that this could lead to a leadership crisis. Haiti today suffers from a dearth of strong and competent leaders and institutions. With his enormous moral authority, Aristide may be the only one with the potential to unify this deeply divided society.⁵⁰ (In this respect, he bears a resemblance to Nelson Mandela.) Rather than turning the presidency over to a handpicked but unproven

and possibly divisive successor, it would have made more sense to have supported his continuation in office from the outset. In the words of one diplomat: "Why do something that would deliberately destabilize the situation?"⁵¹

The answer is "politics." This was primarily a political rather than a legal issue. Though the Haitian constitution barred presidents from succeeding themselves, the problem was essentially extraconstitutional in the sense that there was no provision to take into account a presidency interrupted by a coup d'état. This was quite different from reelection or even the typical Latin American practice of *continuismo* where a president continues in office after his legitimate term has ended. Rather, the call for "three more years" represented a demand that Aristide be allowed to serve the full 5 years for which he had been elected (albeit not within the dates that had been specified). It is significant that this was generally the way the issue was defined in Haiti, where not only the majority of the public but many of the President's political opponents (like former Port-au-Prince Major Evans Paul and even some of the leading families in the economic elite) supported a term extension as the best way to assure national stability.⁵² (Granted, some have changed their minds as a result of the events of last November.)

In the United States, however, the issue was viewed very differently. To Senator Jesse Helms and many other conservatives, the Haitian President remained a covert radical with a hidden agenda and a deep resentment of the United States.⁵³ Thus, part of the price for obtaining congressional support for the U.S./U.N. Haiti operation, including American aid, was Aristide's departure. Any reconsideration of that position by the Clinton administration would have been very difficult politically, and would have jeopardized its desire to remain engaged in Haiti (though, of necessity, at a lower level of commitment) in order to preserve one of its most visible foreign policy successes.

There were, of course, legitimate issues of debate here: Aristide's reliability remains open to question, and certainly

the precedent of a term extension, whatever the reasoning behind it, was undesirable.⁵⁴ But there were no ideal choices. By deciding as it did, the United States weakened Haiti's fragile democratic consensus by depriving the Haitian people of their preferred leader. (That was one of the implications of the embarrassingly low voter turnout in the December 1995 presidential election.)⁵⁵ In the process, too, Washington planted the seeds of an anti-American backlash that may well come back to haunt it. Now, moreover, it will have to deal with a Haitian President, Rene Preval, who comes from the populist wing of *Lavalas*. Combined with that party's sweeping victory at the polls last summer, which brought many such people to Congress, this does not bode well for either U.S.-Haitian relations or the country's stability.

A third point, closely related to the above, concerns economic reform. As of February 1996, foreign aid to Haiti has slowed to a trickle, a casualty of the government's failure to privatize state enterprises. This is an extremely sensitive issue. Former Prime Minister Smarck Michel felt obliged to resign because his efforts on behalf of privatization were not supported by his colleagues; moreover, opposition remains strong in the new Haitian Congress. While it is easy to blame Aristide for the current impasse, the problem is more complex than that: Haitians have reason to be cautious. Not only will privatization result in a loss of jobs at a time of great economic hardship, but it may well increase inequalities and the concentration of wealth. There is concern that state monopolies may simply be transformed into private monopolies. Nationalists want to be sure that these measures will benefit the Haitian people and not just Haitian and foreign elites. They are disturbed about the way these decisions have been made. There is an impression that privatization and other reforms were forced on Aristide by the United States and other foreign lenders as a condition for his restoration and the extension of aid. The critics say that there should be an open debate on these issues, and that the Haitian public should be given accurate information as to exactly what is being proposed and why. Some complain that there has been

inadequate attention given to other kinds of ownership (e.g., public investment trusts, employee ownership plans, or consumer cooperatives) that would tend to democratize rather than further concentrate wealth.⁵⁶ Some also wonder why the Aristide government's original economic strategy—which was generally supported by the United States and international lending agencies in 1991—is now considered unacceptable.⁵⁷

None of this is to deny the need for economic reforms; clearly, the old state controls and monopolies that formed the basis of the Predatory State must be dismantled,⁵⁸ but there are legitimate questions of pace and kind that require further thought. One cannot escape the impression that economic and political measures are being imposed on Haiti without seriously considering the wishes of the Haitian people or their elected representatives, which is ironic in light of all the emphasis that the international community has placed on the country's democratization. There is also considerable doubt as to whether the possible consequences of the present course have been fully thought out. Already there is growing resentment over perceived violations of Haitian sovereignty (in particular, the pressures to privatize and to force out Aristide). If economic aid continues to be withheld, it will be interpreted as a reimposition of international sanctions. The resulting intensification of the Haitian economic crisis and the human suffering that attends it would almost certainly produce a major nationalistic backlash and jeopardize everything that has been accomplished so far.

In sum, there is a risk that the United States and the international community, through their inflexibility, may push Haiti into an even deeper crisis. If that occurs, democracy and political stability are likely to be among the first casualties.

One final issue: What Haiti needs most is an extended period of "nation-building." But in the United States, at least, that term has become a dirty word. One of the ironies of the U.S. intervention is that it destroyed the only strong political institution in the country—the Haitian army. While

this was necessary, it left an institutional vacuum that will be difficult to fill. The danger is that this power vacuum may lead to immobilism, chaos or a personalistic dictatorship. It takes time to build strong institutions and train competent leaders and administrators. Yet, time is the one thing that Haiti does not have. The U.S./U.N. peacekeeping operation has been driven by a definition of success based on a specific time deadline. By spring 1996, the vast bulk of those troops will have departed regardless of the Haitian government's ability to maintain order. While some security arrangements will no doubt be continued, the peacekeeping component will almost certainly be minimal and of limited duration. At some point in 1996, the Haitians will have to swim for themselves, or they will sink. No one really knows which it will be.⁵⁹

The point is that if the United States—the Great Power most affected by the Haitian crisis and with the greatest interest in resolving it—is unwilling to do what is necessary to achieve long-term success (and we have already noted the decline in the administration's aid request), then the rest of the international community is not likely to either. The danger is that half-way efforts will lead to half-way, ineffective results. Once the immediate crisis is over, the foreigners will go home, ensuring that further crises will occur down the road.

The Haitian National Police: Bellwether for Stability?

It may be, of course, that in spite of all its problems Haiti may overcome the legacy of its past. Certainly, progress has been made. The central institution of the Predatory State—the FAdH—has been dismantled. All that is left are several hundred former military personnel who were part of the recently dissolved Interim Public Security Force and who are now being absorbed into the Haitian National Police (HNP).⁶⁰ At the same time, the Front for the Advancement and Progress of Haiti (FRAPH) and the Army's other paramilitary appendages have been disbanded. Without the FAdH to organize and empower

them, such groups will find it much harder to reemerge and regain their former potency.

Clearly, too, the creation of the Haitian National Police has provided a major opportunity to foster political stability and democracy. At minimum, the HNP should serve as a deterrent to any ex-FAdH and ex-*attaches* who might be thinking about launching a comeback. A serious effort has been made to create an apolitical, civilian police force capable of dealing with internal security and criminal problems. Although it is too early to render judgment, preliminary reports were mostly favorable: "Rigorous and impartial recruitment standards and procedures [have been] developed and have produced young and well-motivated recruits." Initially, at least, they were enthusiastically received by the populace.⁶¹

But there are major unresolved problems. The new police are sorely lacking in experience at all levels, but particularly at middle and upper-level management. Many leaders still lack understanding of police work or are otherwise incompetent. There have been instances of corruption and human rights abuse. There is continuing uneasiness about the former members of the FAdH who are being brought into the HNP, especially those in the second-echelon ranks of the command structure. It is not entirely clear that they can be trusted. As of late January 1996, only some 45 of the 169 to 185 command positions in the field had been filled. While there were no available statistics as to the percentage of ex-military in leadership positions, it seemed likely that several dozen, at least, might eventually attain such posts. In the words of one close observer, this was "not reassuring for the future of professional policing in Haiti."⁶²

Then there are other questions. It is uncertain, for instance, how many police the Haitian government will be able to maintain at current salary scales, whether foreign aid for such purposes will be forthcoming and for how long, whether officers will be paid regularly and promptly without the kind of bureaucratic delays that have marked the process in the past, and whether they will have the cars, radios, uniforms and other equipment that they will need to

do their job in a competent, professional manner. By the same token, the credibility and legitimacy of the HNP are likely to be tested by the continued weakness of the judicial and penal systems. If the courts do not function, or if they cannot keep pace with the number of arrests, then the police may be tempted to take the powers of judgment and punishment into their own hands (through extra-judicial executions, for example). That, in turn, would undermine the rule of law before it has a chance to take hold.

Nor is it clear how many police will be needed. As matters now stand, the HNP should be able to provide a minimum level of urban security, but not much more, and it cannot hope to control rural areas. Haiti will probably need more police than the roughly 5,000 to 7,000 that are currently being planned. The U.S. Atlantic Command, for one, believes that some 7,000 to 12,000 security personnel will be required, with 9,000 considered necessary to provide a marginal degree of security.⁶³ In the "fog of peace,"⁶⁴ it is impossible to know what dangers lie ahead. As the FAdH and its paramilitary allies have been disbanded, many former soldiers and *attaches* have turned to crime. Others have sought to organize as pressure groups and have engaged in protests, some of them violent. There is evidence, too, of growing paramilitary "hit-squad" activity. Such problems are likely to increase after the U.N. peacekeepers leave, and it remains to be seen whether the HNP will be up to the task of maintaining law and order.

Finally, there have been recent, highly disturbing signs that all is not well within the HNP: There have been growing reports of police violence, incompetence and graft, and a corresponding sharp decline in public support for the institution. Violent skirmishes between the police and slum dwellers and gangs have become commonplace, especially in Cite Soleil. In January 1996, the situation became so bad that Aristide felt obliged to personally visit Cite Soleil in an attempt to defuse the situation. In turn, President-elect Preval publicly criticized the HNP for not doing its job properly. ("It is as weak as a baby.") The police, he said, had been "committing numerous infractions I have heard

that policemen are brandishing weapons everywhere. This must stop. We must remove the bad apples."⁶⁵

Nor were matters helped by Aristide's attempt to appoint a former FAdH medical officer, Colonel Jean-Marie Fourel Celestin, as police director. U.S. officials considered Celestin a human rights violator; moreover, he had reportedly allowed corruption to flourish when he was in charge of security at the National Palace.⁶⁶ While the nomination was fortunately rejected by the Haitian parliament, the affair did little to bolster confidence in either Aristide's judgment or the HNP's future. Similarly, Aristide's decision to incorporate hundreds of ex-military personnel into the institution⁶⁷ seemed certain to undermine its civilian nature and nonpartisan image and increase tensions within the force. In the past, some rank and file have indicated their unwillingness to work with ex-FAdH who are in leadership positions.⁶⁸

Things Fall Apart: Five Scenarios.

In short, while the moment of truth is still to come the HNP's honeymoon is clearly over. There is a very real danger—if not a probability—that sooner or later things will fall apart. The following scenarios are suggestive of what could go wrong:

The "Woodwork Hypothesis." In this scenario, shortly after the departure of the U.N. peacekeepers former FAdH and paramilitary personnel would reemerge from hiding in Haiti and the Dominican Republic, where they had been stockpiling arms and biding their time, waiting for the chance to regain power. The country would be plunged into civil war.

This is the most widely feared scenario, but it is also (at least in the form presented above) overrated. For one thing, there is some doubt as to whether there are any large arms stockpiles. U.S. troops received numerous tips of such caches following the September 1994 intervention, but were never able to locate any. Colonel Mark Boyatt, who commanded the U.S. Special Forces in Haiti, believes they

do not exist.⁶⁹ Beyond this, any resurgent FAdH/*macoute* army would require leadership, organization and popular support, and these are most notable by their absence. Even if leadership and organization could be developed and arms acquired (and this last, certainly, would not be difficult), there is no sea in which these fish could swim. The populace is no longer cowed; it would provide little shelter, intelligence or other support for such an army. On the contrary, it would almost certainly resist a Duvalierist restoration with every means available.

Moreover, it is improbable, in the short run, that the United States or the United Nations would allow such a development. They have too much at stake to let the situation fall apart so fast. For President Clinton, it would be a political embarrassment and perhaps worse. Though Haiti has recently been overshadowed by Bosnia, it still represents one of his foreign policy "successes"; its return to chaos would reopen the immigration problem and expose him to Republican attack in an election year. Within the U.S. Government and the international community, there is a widespread recognition of the need for some kind of continuing security arrangement after February 1996. At this writing, it appears that 1,900 peacekeepers will stay on for a few more months and that there will be some continuing foreign police monitoring and training of the HNP.

In sum, a large-scale attack seems unlikely and, if attempted, would probably not succeed. The United States and the international community would not allow it, and the Haitian people and their government (including the HNP) would resist it. Nor is there any evidence that the remnants of the FAdH and the paramilitaries have the leadership, organization or will to prevail. Indeed, they appear to be thoroughly demoralized. These elements were never very brave or competent, preferring mostly to shoot people who could not shoot back. Given the radically changed balance of forces within Haiti today, it seems unlikely that they will be able to recapture power in the short term. (The longer run may be another matter.)

This being said, there will undoubtedly be some anti-government conspiracies (these are endemic in Haiti), and some *zenglendos* (gunmen) will come out of hiding. One should expect an increase in terrorism aimed at probing the government's defenses. This is the real danger of the "woodwork" hypothesis. It would not take a large or well-organized force to create incidents that might trigger an overreaction by the HNP, which in turn could spark more mob violence and do incalculable damage to the government's legitimacy,⁷⁰ as well as to national reconciliation and democratization.

The "Jacobinization" of the Police. Another, more medium or long-term possibility, is that the Haitian National Police might become politicized by radical elements in *Lavalas* and turned into an instrument of terror, class warfare and revenge. In this scenario, the police would in effect become the functional equivalent of the old military, but would be under the control of the radical Left rather than the Right.

This danger would be most likely to occur under the leadership of Aristide and/or his chosen successor, Rene Preval, should they decide to revert to the kind of "direct democracy" that seemed to be developing during the former's initial period in office. Though many observers today argue that the radical *Lavalas* political/socioeconomic program is all but dead, political and class conflicts in Haiti remain so volatile and the historical record so dismal that the resurrection of the project in the form of a Jacobin dictatorship cannot be discounted. One should remember that dictators are not always military men. (Witness the Duvaliers.) Moreover, some of the events since last June have been disturbing: The turmoil surrounding the parliamentary elections, the emergence of something fairly close (at least at first glance) to a one-party state, the growth of polarization and violence, and Aristide's own erratic behavior (the November "disarmament" speech, the seeming encouragement of the campaign for "three more years") have once again raised fears and suspicions about government intentions.

Then, there have been other incidents: An unsuccessful attempt in early 1995 to place several hundred unvetted men in the Interim Public Security Force, for instance, was initially interpreted by American officials as a move by Aristide to take political control of the military. While most U.S. officials eventually concluded that the episode was the product of lower-level conspiracy and incompetence rather than a high-level government effort to subvert or take over the institution,⁷¹ more recent developments have resurrected the concern over politicization: At the ceremony for the first graduating class from the new Police Academy, for example, Aristide led the graduates in a prolonged chant, culminating in cries of "*Lavalas! Lavalas! Lavalas!*"⁷² (This was not, to put it mildly, the most auspicious beginning for a constabulary that was supposed to be nonpartisan.) Subsequently, the attempted appointment of Celestin and the incorporation of hundreds of ex-FADH into the HNP have intensified fears of politicization and human rights abuses. At the same time, there has been growing suspicion, even within the Clinton administration, that Haitian security forces have been involved in political assassinations. In one notorious case, the Haitian government apparently even impeded FBI efforts to investigate the killing.⁷³

A major issue, of course, is Aristide himself. Who is the real Aristide, the unstable demagogue portrayed by the CIA or the pragmatic statesman who seemed to be emerging in the months following his restoration? The evidence of his recent behavior, though obviously not unmixed, would seem to warrant a cautiously optimistic prognosis. The presidential election has now been held and Preval has assumed office, both without incident. Haiti's economic dependence on the international community would appear to dictate continued moderation. On the other hand, the political culture, the class antagonisms, the desire for revenge, the likelihood of continuing political and social violence, the enduring economic disaster and the frustrations that it is generating, and Haiti's deteriorating relations with its international sponsors (especially the United States) all make some degree of state or

state-sanctioned violence likely in the years ahead. If Aristide no longer speaks of his admiration of Robespierre, he might revert to previous form under the right circumstances. Nor can one be confident of his successor or his successor's successor. As long as the state can manipulate the composition of the police and the system of economic rewards under which they operate, the HNP will be susceptible to political abuse.

"The Mob." A third scenario, which might be independent of or closely related to the first two, would involve massive mob violence directed against the Haitian oligarchy, former military and paramilitary elements, leaders of the political opposition, and common criminals. There is still an enormous amount of suppressed tension in Haiti. Natural desires for justice and revenge for the human rights abuses of the old regime have been largely frustrated by the absence of functioning police, judicial and penal systems, and the reluctance of U.S./U.N. peacekeepers to seek out and arrest past human rights violators. While massive violence has been generally avoided (thanks to public restraint, the leadership of President Aristide, and the presence of international peacekeepers), there have been many isolated instances of vigilante justice.⁷⁴ There is a very real danger that this violence could grow much worse after the U.N. peacekeepers leave, especially if crime continues to increase, the military and *macoutes* reemerge, and the Left seeks to mobilize the masses to defend the government or wage class war. The single event most likely to trigger such violence: the assassination of Jean-Bertrand Aristide.

The Rise of the "New Macoutes." With the economy depressed and tens of thousands of ex-military and paramilitary unemployed, some of these alienated and armed elements have turned to crime. Many of the robberies and shootings that have been taking place are believed to be the work of former police *attaches*, some of whom are hiring out their services as assassins. Such killings have become commonplace, and some—a couple dozen or so—appear to be political.⁷⁵ Among the most notorious of the latter were the "hit-squad" murders of Mireille Durocher

Bertin, a prominent Aristide critic and defender of the Cedras dictatorship, and former Brigadier General Henri Max Mayard. Since a number of other ex-military officers, wealthy businessmen and associates of the old regime have also been assassinated, there has been speculation among U.S. military intelligence officers that some in the Aristide camp are engaged in a preemptive campaign to destroy the enemy (or at least its potential leaders) before the U.N. forces leave and the enemy has a chance to launch an attack of its own.⁷⁶

This may well be, but at this point there is very little hard evidence. (Or at least none that has been made public.) While the government, or elements within it, is the most obvious suspect—Interior Minister Mondesir Beaubrun (since replaced) was even accused of masterminding the Durocher Bertin murder⁷⁷—there are certainly other possibilities. Some of these killings may be drug-related. Some may be the work of disgruntled ex-soldiers who have not received benefits to which they feel entitled. Some may have been provocations by the Right, designed to undermine public confidence in the government's intentions and ability to maintain order and to destroy its international support. Nor have all those targeted been members or supporters of the dictatorship; some are Aristide partisans or at least foes of the Cedras regime.⁷⁸

What can be said for certain is that there is a very large potential for things to get worse. There are too many guns floating around, and the police have neither the manpower, the vehicles nor the experience to patrol the whole country. Already, ex-soldiers have formed groups like the Rally of Military Dismissed Without Reasons to press for stipends, jobs and other compensation for their lost careers. Disruptive protests have been held. Shadowy groups, apparently linked to the Rally and elements in the now-defunct Interim Public Security Force and to such Aristide foes as former dictator Prosper Avril, have organized conspiracies and conducted assassinations. Criminal gangs, such as the "Red Army" in Cite Soleil, are

sowing panic in the slums, attacking the police and inciting mob violence.

Meanwhile, the oligarchy, which has increasingly become a target of the crime wave that has shaken the country, has bolstered its private security forces. These organizations have grown in number and size since Aristide's return, and some are better armed than the Haitian National Police.⁷⁹ The danger, of course, is that these groups have the potential for acting as private armies and death squads. (Some may already be engaged in such activities.) There is also a concern that the oligarchy may provide financial and other support to violent groups and that ex-FAdH officers who are brought into the HNP might link up with former colleagues and *attaches* on the outside.

By the same token, there is also concern about Aristide's presidential security force, which was chosen on the basis of loyalty rather than professionalism or merit. It is this group of several dozen bodyguards—the so-called “inner circle” within the larger “outer circle” of Palace Guards—that U.S. officials suspect of conducting political killings. Some members of the unit have developed an arrogant attitude which, along with their lack of training, has caused serious problems in their performance and relations with other Haitian security units.⁸⁰ This is especially unsettling when one considers the historical uses and abuses of such forces: Duvalier, it may be recalled, used his presidential guard to help neutralize the FAdH, elevating it to the status of a military department. Indeed, the guard became the most powerful military unit in Port-au-Prince.

Obviously, this is potentially a very volatile mixture. If the political situation polarizes, terrorism will likely increase, with the extremes stoking each other's violence. From there, it would be only a short descent into chaos or civil war.

Whether that worst-case scenario actually occurs remains to be seen. At minimum, however, one should expect a rise in crime in the post-February period, as the international peacekeeping presence diminishes and

criminals become bolder. This process, indeed, has already begun. In recent months, criminal activity has sharply increased. The gangs are proliferating, and they are better organized and armed than ever. In confrontations, they often outnumber and have more powerful guns than the police. Some have automatic weapons. While this kind of activity will not *in itself* produce political instability, it can help undermine stability by frightening away foreign investors, sparking more vigilante violence, weakening the authority and morale of the government and especially the police, overloading the judicial system (which is barely functioning as it is), and creating a growing climate of personal insecurity that, along with more overtly political violence, could return Haiti to a state of relative anarchy.

A "*Bonapartist Restoration*." Finally, remilitarization and politicization could occur along traditional lines with the HNP becoming the functional equivalent of the old FAdH. While in the short run the prospects of a coup are unlikely (though not impossible if the wrong people gain control of the institution), in the longer term deeply rooted values, attitudes and habits are likely to reassert themselves. A certain amount of corruption and brutality are almost inevitable. Moreover, if Haiti fails to develop strong democratic institutions, the police/military may be tempted to step into the vacuum. This would be most likely to occur in periods of intensified political or class conflict, especially if such interventions were supported by or at the behest of conservative/reactionary elements in the business and political sectors. The pattern might be similar to the gradual militarization of politics that occurred after the departure of the U.S. Marines in 1934.⁸¹

Conclusions And Recommendations.

While none of the above scenarios is inevitable, the United States and United Nations need to be sensitized to these potential developments and devise a long-range plan to avoid them. Otherwise, the tactical success that has been enjoyed so far may presently turn into a strategic failure.

The most obvious requirement is for a continuing international security presence. The problem is that the United States and the United Nations do not want to stay, and the Haitian government only belatedly had the courage to ask them.⁸² What is needed is an extension of the U.N. peacekeeping mission. The number of troops can be reduced, but some substantial presence is needed for at least another year. Beyond this, a smaller presence will probably be necessary for several more years—i.e., until the HNP can stand on its own feet and an adequate judicial system is in place and functioning. Without this, the entire experiment may very well collapse. In addition, a rapid response force should be formed to back up the Haitian government as circumstances require. There should be U.S. involvement in all of these operations to bolster their credibility.

At the same time, there must be ongoing foreign monitoring and training of the Haitian police. To expect the HNP to be professionalized and capable of maintaining law and order after only four months training and a few more months experience is unrealistic, particularly in light of the enormous challenges it will face and the resource constraints under which it will have to operate. It will need a lot of help. Continuing international civilian police activities must provide hands-on mentoring and backup in the field. Passive observation is not enough. Civilian police advisors should serve as role models to their Haitian counterparts and supply advice to the Haitian government and ICITAP training authorities.⁸³ Particular attention needs to be paid to improving the HNP's leadership at all levels, creating an effective investigatory capability (to date, the Special Investigative Unit is virtually inoperative), projecting a meaningful and constructive police presence in rural areas, and developing special backup units to deal with emergency situations. (Too often, officers have found themselves in untenable positions, surrounded by gangs or mobs and sometimes taken hostage.)

The HNP will need more of everything—more police, more equipment, and especially more training and vetting. Part of the challenge will be to expand quantity without

sacrificing quality. It would be a tragic mistake to accept unvetted ex-FAdH officers into the police. Indeed, the fewer ex-military, the better. Even those who are not guilty of human rights abuses carry a stigma by dint of having been a part of the repressive apparatus of the Predatory State. Inevitably, their presence reduces the legitimacy and public acceptance of the institution. By the same token, police officers—whether ex-FAdH or not—who abuse their power must be dismissed. The struggle for a new Haiti requires a “clean” constabulary.

All this, of course, will take political will and money. If a larger and more competent police force is to be created and maintained, Haiti's foreign sponsors will have to provide much of the financing. Haiti simply can't do the job on its own; it can't even afford the present force, at current salaries. While salaries may have to be lowered to a somewhat more realistic level, even that will not be enough. In addition to personnel, the HNP needs more equipment—more vehicles, radios, and weapons—and a much better maintenance program. This last is especially important. Haitians must be trained and given the means to take care of what they are given, or current efforts largely will be wasted.

These recommendations will make some people nervous, and understandably so. After all, the larger and more formidable the HNP, the greater its potential for political intervention. One need only glance back at Haitian history to appreciate the danger. But the country finds itself at a critical juncture. The deteriorating security situation must be stopped before it gets completely out of hand, and that means strengthening the police. Thus, the critical importance of ongoing professionalization efforts, designed to instill respect for human rights and constitutional authority. This kind of training will be needed for decades to come.

Of even more immediate concern than a possible coup is the danger that additional and more potent weapons might be used irresponsibly or fall into the wrong hands. The misuse of these arms could easily make a bad situation

much worse. The last thing Haiti needs is hordes of cops swaggering around on their beats with automatic weapons at the ready. The model should continue to be community-based policing, where good police-community relations are assiduously cultivated and the use of firearms is a last resort. While the HNP will need heavier weapons to deal with situations where officers are outgunned and in dire peril, these arms must be closely controlled and limited to special elite backup units trained to deal with such emergencies.

All this being said, it must also be recognized that these kinds of needs are only part of a much larger equation. Without functioning courts and prisons, security will remain an illusion. While progress has been made in these areas, there are light years to go. By the same token, security will be hard to attain as long as Haiti remains economically prostrate. The economic substructure of violence must be chipped away or it will undermine any efforts that are made to establish political stability and democracy.

These facets of the Haitian crisis, as well as others (environmental and public health needs, for instance), have been dealt with by other scholars,⁸⁴ and I need not duplicate their efforts. The point is that Haiti will need aid—and a lot of it—in the years ahead. One cannot build a nation in 1 year or even 5; rather, there must be a substantial foreign commitment for the foreseeable future. This will, it is true, prolong the country's dependence on the international community, but the alternative is even less desirable. Unless Haiti's sponsors are willing to stay the course, everything that is being accomplished now will be for naught. In effect, Haitians will have been set up to fail.

In short, there are no easy answers to the Haitian dilemma. If continuing international involvement will not guarantee success, its absence will most assuredly guarantee failure. Moreover, one cannot simply throw money at the problem. Haiti has a very limited capacity to absorb aid. Ultimately, the key will be the development of the country's human resources, so that Haitians may

gradually take over full responsibility for their own national development. Until then, however, they will need large amounts of training, education and supervision—the latter to assure that the aid delivered will not be misused.

A few words should also be said about Haitian responsibilities. The international community can nurture Haiti's socioeconomic and political development, but only Haitians can build a nation. As Aristide emphasized in his recent state of the union address, Haitians must solve their own problems. Among other things, that means that wealthy Haitians must be assured that they "can live in safety and with confidence," but also that they be willing to "play fair"—i.e., respect the rule of law and the legitimate aspirations of the majority to improve their lives. In addition, they must be willing to invest in Haiti—in jobs, trades and businesses—so that the country might have a better future.⁸⁵

At the same time, the Preval administration should accelerate the reform process. The issue of decentralization is especially important. The system of centralized state controls that has for so long sucked resources out of the countryside for the benefit of Port-au-Prince must be dismantled. The peasantry must receive a fair share of the economic pie. Moreover, the logjam must be broken on privatization, civil service reform, and transparency/accountability in the use of public funds. Without progress in these areas, international lenders are not likely to extend Haiti the grants and loans it so desperately needs.

Another point: As Samuel Huntington has noted, "the stability of democratic regimes depends, first, on the ability of the principal political elites . . . to work together to deal with the problems confronting their society and to refrain from exploiting those problems for their own immediate material or political advantage."⁸⁶ The observation is particularly relevant to Haiti, with its traditional political culture of suspicion, rivalry, and intrigue. Beyond the message for Haitian elites in general, there is a lesson for Aristide and Preval: They have been close allies in the past, and they must continue to cooperate with one another over

the next 5 years. Already, there have been reports of growing friction between the two. Aristide has made several minor public statements which have been interpreted as undermining Preval. There has even been speculation that a successful Preval presidency might not be in Aristide's political interest. If Preval failed, it is said, Aristide could return to power in 5 years as the "savior of Haiti." (Perhaps even earlier, if the incumbent stepped down.) Hopefully, this is nothing more than the usual Port-au-Prince rumor mongering. One thing is for certain: Preval will need Aristide. Without the latter's support, the new President may not be able to govern.⁸⁷ By the same token, should the country come apart over the next few years, there may not be any pieces left for Aristide to pick up.

The same warning holds true for parliament. One of the greatest dangers in the coming years lies in the potential for immobilism. Already, power seems to be trifurcating among the Preval administration, Aristide, and a radical legislature. One can easily imagine a scenario where the President might have his hands tied by either or both of the other components in this "triad of power." If this indeed occurs, the result will be an ineffectual presidency. That, in turn, would further undermine the democratic experiment, and make the country even more difficult to govern than it already is.

A note, too, for the United States and other providers of foreign loans and grants: Though Preval comes from the populist wing of *Lavalas*, many observers consider him more pragmatic than Aristide. While the latter dragged his heels on many politically difficult reforms, Preval has already indicated his intention of enforcing tax laws, replacing civil servants who don't work, and pushing ahead with privatization "in the interests of the Haitian people." Rather than spending funds on public enterprises that lose money, he has pledged to "modernize the state" and bring the private sector into the management of state-owned enterprises.⁸⁸

This is a promising beginning. International lenders and donors would be well advised not to allow any

preconceptions about Preval's "radicalism" to get in the way of developing a constructive relationship with the new President. At the same time, they must be flexible. Preval has indicated that he would be open to several different forms of privatization. The United States, the IMF, the World Bank and other donors need to work with him to find mutually acceptable solutions to Haiti's problems, rather than trying to impose preconceived policies on the Haitian people and their elected representatives.⁸⁹

Finally, there is the issue of politics, which continues to both drive and limit U.S. Haitian policy. Neither Democrats nor Republicans are free from sin in these matters. This is, after all, an election year. Some of the recent congressional hearings on Haiti have evinced a distinctly partisan tone, giving the appearance that they were "less about foreign policy than about the upcoming presidential campaign."⁹⁰ To turn Haiti into a political football, with the Democrats bent on using it as a "political success" and the Republicans determined to prove it a "failure," would be both irresponsible and a prescription for disaster. There is too much at stake to play such games.

The central lesson of our recent experience with Haiti is that half-way efforts lead to half-way, ineffective, and sometimes counterproductive results.⁹¹ In the current instance, Washington has defined success in such narrow terms (the restoration of Aristide and the creation of conditions that would allow a U.S. exit) that it could hardly fail. The really difficult and painful issues have been mostly finessed. Under such circumstances, the danger facing the United States and the international community is that they will have raised Haitian expectations to astronomical heights only to dash them through an unwillingness to do what is necessary. That is asking for trouble. If the current deadlock over privatization and foreign aid are allowed to continue, it will lead to further socioeconomic decline. Haiti will sink back into darkness. That, in turn, will feed the nationalistic backlash that has already begun, produce more political turmoil, and resurrect the exodus of desperate

Haitians fleeing to U.S. shores. Then we will once again be back where we started.

Postscript.

On the last day of February 1996, after overcoming a threatened veto by China, the United Nations Security Council voted to extend the U.N. Mission in Haiti for 4 months. The UNMIH will be composed of 1,200 troops and 300 international civilian police. In addition, Canada will provide an extra 700 soldiers at its own expense. Whether this will be enough to maintain order and allow for a final pull-out after June 1996 is very much open to question. Nevertheless, with soldiers in Bosnia and U.S. elections scheduled for November, Washington found a continuing U.S. peacekeeping presence politically unacceptable. The United States will continue to give the Haitian police basic training and advanced instruction in evidence-gathering and analysis, crowd control, and other specialized skills for the next several years. It will also keep some 200 to 400 construction and engineering troops in the country for about a year to repair bridges and roads, restore electric power, and perform other civic action functions. But at this point, interest in Haiti has declined sharply in both the United States and the international community in general. A telling indicator: No heads of state, not even the secretary-general of the United Nations, attended President Preval's inauguration. The highest ranking foreign officials were the Vice Presidents of the Dominican Republic and Taiwan. Whereas previously the United States had sent President Clinton, Vice President Gore and Secretary of State Christopher to Haiti when it wanted to highlight this foreign policy success, this time the highest-ranking U.S. representative was the delegate to the United Nations.

ENDNOTES

1. See, especially, Robert I. Rotberg with Christopher K. Clague, *Haiti: The Politics of Squalor*, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1971; Michel-Rolf Trouillot, *Haiti: State Against Nation*, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1990; Michel S. Laguerre, *The Military and Society in*

Haiti, Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1993; and Mats Lundahl, *Politics or Markets? Essays on Haitian Underdevelopment*, London: Routledge, 1992.

2. This was not always the case. In the 1960s and 1970s, political culture studies were attacked by the Left and for awhile went out of fashion. More recently, however, there has been a renaissance. Indeed, no less an authority than Harry Eckstein has argued that political culture may be one of the two "still viable general approaches to political theory and explanation proposed since the early fifties to replace the long-dominant formal-legalism of the field—the other being political rational choice theory." See his "A Culturalist Theory of Political Change," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. LXXXII, September 1988, p. 789. For a recent overview and sampling of the literature, see Larry Diamond, ed., *Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993.

3. See, e.g., Donald E. Schulz and Gabriel Marcella, *Reconciling the Irreconcilable: The Troubled Outlook for U.S. Policy Toward Haiti*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1994, pp. 7-17; Robert and Nancy Heintz, *Written in Blood: The Story of the Haitian People, 1492-1971*, Boston: Houghton-Mifflin Company, 1978, p. 6; Lawrence Harrison, "Voodoo Politics," *The Atlantic Monthly*, June 1993, pp. 105-07; and Rotberg, *Haiti: The Politics of Squalor*, pp. 17-24. The best general treatment of the subject to appear in recent years is Trouillot's *Haiti: State Against Nation*. On the social underpinnings of the political culture, see James Leyburn, *The Haitian People*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966.

4. Robert Maguire suggests, and I agree, that the traditional elite will probably not regain political control, but will focus on maintaining—and enhancing—economic control. Comments on a previous draft of this report.

5. Harrison, "Voodoo Politics," p. 106. Generalizations like these are by their very nature unfair. Some members of the elite do share western beliefs in democracy, equality, and so on. But they are not typical of their class.

6. Leyburn, *The Haitian People*, pp. 287-288.

7. Rotberg, *Haiti: The Politics of Squalor*, p. 18.

8. See, e.g., Jacques Roumain's classic novel of rural Haiti, *Gouverneurs de la rosee*, Paris: Messidor, 1944.

9. Rotberg, *Haiti: The Politics of Squalor*, p. 18.

10. Anthony Maingot, *Grasping the Nettle: A "National Liberation" Option for Haiti*, Miami: University of Miami, March 1994, p. 2. Michel-Rolf Trouillot has noted that, while collective action is rare at the national level because of the stigma of illegitimacy attached to politics and political institutions, this is much less true at local levels. More on this presently.

11. From September 20-24, 1995, a major conference on Haiti, organized by the World Peace Foundation, the Haitian Studies Association and the University of Puerto Rico, was held in Mayagüez, Puerto Rico. For a detailed report on that gathering, see Jennifer L. McCoy, "Haiti: Prospects for Political and Economic Reconstruction," Cambridge, MA: World Peace Foundation, November 1995.

12. On these developments, see especially Robert E. Maguire, "From Outsiders to Insiders: Emerging Leadership and Political Change in Haiti," paper presented at the conference on "Dialogue for Development: The Political and Economic Reconstruction of Haiti," Mayagüez, Puerto Rico, September 23, 1995.

13. The initial impression was that Haiti was precariously close to becoming a one-party state. This concern was probably exaggerated, however. The *Lavalas* deputies are by no means monolithic, and there is already evidence (in their rejection of Prime Minister Werleigh's budget and Aristide's nominee for national police chief) that parliament will not be a rubber stamp. For a more favorable evaluation of the elections, see the testimony of James F. Dobbins, the State Department's Special Haiti Coordinator, before the Latin American Subcommittee of the U.S. House of Representatives' International Relations Committee, October 12, 1995, pp.3-6.

14. Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), *Daily Report: Latin America*, November 14, 1995.

15. *Ibid.*, November 27 and 29, 1995.

16. At the time, *Lavalas* was deeply fractured between a camp wanting "three more years" and those who accepted or promoted elections. Information from Rachel Neild.

17. Again, it remains an open question which aspects of the dominant political culture the masses share, and to what degree. For instance, many observers argue that they have been much less violent than the upper and middle classes—that they have been mainly the targets rather than the perpetrators of such behavior. Similarly, it is noted that the level of common crime is quite low in Haiti, especially compared to the violence that wracks many Latin American (not to mention U.S.) cities. On the other hand, one could hypothesize that this

lack of violence may in part be due to the highly repressive nature of Haitian regimes historically: Unsanctioned violence risked drawing draconian retaliation; therefore, popular violence was suppressed. Certainly, instances of mob justice have become fairly common since the fall of the Duvaliers. Moreover, the poor provide a large pool of desperate people, some of whom are always ready to serve as *attaches* or thugs for a pittance. The truth is that one cannot know how the lower classes would behave if they found themselves on top. But the elite, clearly, are terrified by the prospect.

18. Robert Fatton, "From Predatory Rule to Accountable Governance," paper presented at the conference on "Dialogue for Development," September 23, 1995, p. 2.

19. In the words of Trouillot, "*Lavalas* remains a loose amalgam of factions united around Mr. Aristide but unable to mature into a viable political party." Michel-Rolf Trouillot, "Haiti's Only Hope Is More Hope," *The New York Times*, December 16, 1995. On the need for stable parties as a "crucial condition" for a stable democracy, see Seymour Martin Lipset, "The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. LIX, February 1994, pp. 14-15.

20. Conseil Electoral Provisoire, as reported in *Haiti Info*, Vol. IV, January 13, 1996, via the Internet.

21. Inter-American Development Bank, *Emergency Economic Recovery Program: Haiti, Report of the Joint Mission*, November 7-20, 1994, Washington, DC: IADB, January 3, 1995, p. 28; International Monetary Fund, *Haiti-Recent Developments*, SM/95/43, Washington, DC: IMF, March 1, 1995, p. 2.

22. To give an idea: About 80 percent of the national budget, some three-quarters of which was derived from revenues (taxes) generated in the countryside, was spent in Port-au-Prince. Yet, 70 percent of the population lives in rural areas. Robert Maguire, "Sisyphus Revisited: Grassroots Development and Community Conflict in Haiti," *Caribbean Geography*, Vol. V, 1994, p. 130; Maguire, "From Outsiders to Insiders," p. 9.

23. Michel S. Laguerre, "Business and Corruption," *California Management Review*, Vol. XXXVI, Spring 1994, pp. 94-95.

24. On the role of the Haitian military, see especially Laguerre, *The Military and Society in Haiti*, and the recent work of Robert Maguire: "Haiti: State Terror in Mufti," *Caribbean Affairs*, Vol. VII, September/October 1994, pp. 78-95; and "Demilitarizing Public Order in a Predatory State: The Case of Haiti," North-South Agenda Paper No. 17,

Miami: University of Miami, North-South Center Press, December 1995.

25. Schulz and Marcella, *Reconciling the Irreconcilable*, pp. 14-15.

26. Other influential families who supported the dictatorship included the Acras, the Madsens, the Duforts, the Elyzees, the Khawlys, the Lissades, the Feurys, the Mourras and the Moscosos. Other business supporters included Gerard Cassis, George Sassine, Reynold Bonnefil, Raymond Roy, Bernard Craan, and Lionel Turnier.

27. Sidney W. Mintz, "Can Haiti Change?," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. LXXIV, January/February 1995, p. 86.

28. Trouillot, *Haiti: State Against Nation*, p. 84.

29. Mats Lundahl, "The Haitian Dilemma Reexamined: Lessons from the Past in Light of Some New Economic Theory," paper presented at the conference on "Dialogue for Development," September 21, 1995, p. 5.

30. At its peak in 1990, the assembly sector accounted for only about 46,000 jobs in a labor force of 3.5 million. By the end of 1994, however, operations had virtually ceased. At present (late 1995), it employs about 10,000 workers. Don Bohning, "Intervention in Haiti Slowly Restoring Peace," *Miami Herald*, September 16, 1995; McCoy, "Haiti: Prospects for Political and Economic Reconstruction," p. 9.

31. Lundahl, "The Haitian Dilemma," pp. 28-29.

32. Larry Rohter, "Privatization Starts Feud in Haiti," *The New York Times*, October 19, 1995.

33. Pierre-Richard Leroy, principal advisor to the Ministry of Economy and Finances, in a conversation with the author, September 22, 1995.

34. Bohning, "Intervention in Haiti."

35. For a more optimistic assessment, see the testimony of Norma Parker, deputy assistant administrator for Latin America and the Caribbean, U.S. Agency for International Development, before the U.S. House of Representatives' Sub-Committee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, October 12, 1995. The \$1.8 billion aid figure is taken from this document (p. 22). The 3.5 percent growth and the inflation estimates are from Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, *Preliminary Overview of the Latin American and Caribbean Economy, 1995*, Santiago, Chile: United Nations, 1995, pp. 45, 49.

36. Rachel Neild, *et. al.*, *Policing Haiti: Preliminary Assessment of the New Civilian Security Force*, Washington, DC: Washington Office on Latin America, September 1995, pp. 30-31; "Jeremie Report: Impunity, High Prices and Anger," *Haiti Info*, January 11, 1996, via Internet.

37. The program for 1997 will be reduced still further. Parker testimony, pp. 6-7; Larry Rohter, "The Suspense Isn't Over in Haiti," *The New York Times*, October 15, 1995.

38. Estimates of the amount of foreign aid being frozen vary. The \$200 million figure is from John Sweeney, "Stuck in Haiti," *Foreign Policy*, No. 102, Spring 1996, p. 149.

39. Heintz and Heintz, *Written in Blood*, p. 3.

40. See, e.g., the critique of Alex Dupuy, "Haiti: Economic Development for Whom?", paper presented at the conference on "Dialogue for Development," September 22, 1995.

41. According to John Merrill, the deputy director of the OSD Haiti Task Force, only about 30,000 or so of the roughly 175,000 guns in Haiti were ever seized. Comments at the "Dialogue for Development," September 23, 1995.

42. Quoted in Neild, *et. al.*, *Policing Haiti*, p. 36.

43. *Ibid.*, pp. 28-29.

44. Heintz and Heintz, *Written in Blood*, p. 6.

45. On the legal implications of this amnesty, see Jeffrey A. Williams and John N. Petrie, "The Carter Mission to Haiti: Unintended Consequences for Human Rights Law," *Fletcher Forum*, Vol. XIX, Summer/Fall 1995, pp. 95-114.

46. "Toto" Constant eventually showed up in the United States, where he was arrested. He is currently in the process of being returned to Haiti.

47. For an extensive list of potentially indictable military officers and *macoutes*, see Henry F. Carey, "Regime Change, Elite Change, Pragmatism, and Consensus: Political Reconciliation and Rule of Law in Occupied Haiti," paper presented at the 1995 meeting of the Latin American Studies Association, Washington, DC, September 30, 1995, pp. 16-17. As this monograph goes to press, the Truth Commission has just turned its findings over to the judiciary, which is supposed to bring to trial those named in the report. The names have not yet been made public.

48. The latter issue, of course had particular salience in Florida, where Governor Lawton Chiles had filed suit against the Federal Government to recoup millions of dollars that the state had to spend on illegal immigrants. A prolonged, major immigration crisis would have severely damaged Democratic prospects in the November mid-term elections and, beyond that, in 1996. Florida was a key "swing" state, and the Clinton administration could not afford to write it off.

A detailed examination of the role played by domestic interest groups, including the Black Caucus, Randall Robinson and other key players, may be found in Roland I. Perusse, *Haitian Democracy Restored, 1991-1995*, Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1995, pp. 70-89.

49. It is possible, of course, that even had a more aggressive disarmament campaign been waged the problem might not have been solved. As one critical study of the U.S. effort notes, "given the inherent logistical difficulties of disarming paramilitary groups, the number of weapons obtained. . . might not have been much higher." Moreover, confiscated weapons could be replaced, since Haiti's borders are wide open to contraband. Still, it seems reasonable to suppose that a much more effective disarmament campaign could have been conducted had that been an American priority from the beginning. And the effort would have had an important psychological effect on both the Haitian people and the *macoutes*. It would have clearly demonstrated the U.S. commitment, enhanced American relations with both the Haitian people and their government, and probably deterred and reduced some of the ensuing violence. See Neild, *et. al.*, *Policing Haiti*, p. 37.

50. This is not to say that he could not be a destabilizing force as well. There is a potential for either outcome.

51. Rohter, "The Suspense Isn't Over in Haiti."

52. See, e.g., Douglas Farah, "Aristide Willing to Quit, But Many Want Him to Stay," *The Washington Post*, October 1, 1995; and Larry Rohter, "Haitian President Is Hinting That He Might Not Step Down," *The New York Times*, November 25, 1995.

53. This is putting it politely. Some even claimed that Aristide was psychologically unstable and addicted to drugs. See Schulz and Marcella, *Reconciling the Irreconcilable*, pp. 29-30; Bill Gertz, "Events Seen Backing CIA Report," *Washington Times*, November 28, 1995; "The CIA and Haiti," *The New York Times*, December 8, 1995.

54. Still, had the United States and the international community supported Aristide on this issue from the beginning, the danger of abuse might have been significantly reduced. A constitutional amendment, for

instance, might have provided a legal, internationally sanctioned solution to the problem. But once having taken a public stand, it was difficult to reverse course.

55. Granted, other factors were at work. After the chaotic congressional and local elections of the previous June with their attendant make-up and run-off ballotings, many Haitians suffered from election fatigue. Many, too, were disillusioned that democracy had brought no improvement in their economic condition. In addition, there had been only limited campaigning. It was not even clear that the vote would be held until early December, and the most formidable opposition leaders boycotted the race. Nor did Aristide bother to publicly endorse Preval until a couple days prior to the election. All this being said, however, the most convincing single explanation as to why more people did not vote is that the candidate they wanted (Aristide) was not on the ballot. The implications for the legitimacy of the process are obvious.

56. Cam Duncan, "Haiti Bucks Privatization," *Multinational Monitor*, Vol. XVI, November 1995, pp. 6-7.

57. For a comparison of that program with the current one, see Dupuy, "Haiti: Economic Development For Whom?"

58. Here see especially Lundahl, "The Haitian Dilemma Reexamined," pp. 14-15, on the need for the "constructive destruction" of the state.

59. When I made this point at the Mayagüez conference, Colonel David Patton, the U.N. Mission's Executive for Haitian Security, objected that I was being too pessimistic. We shall see.

60. FBIS, *Daily Report: Latin America*, December 8, 1995; "Former Haitian Soldiers Join Police," *Miami Herald*, December 8, 1995.

61. Neild, *et. al.*, *Policing Haiti*, pp. 22, 29-30.

62. Rachel Neild, personal communication. Neild estimated that of the last 130 ex-military officers in the now disbanded Interim Public Security Force, as many as 77 might be incorporated into the HNP in leadership positions after being vetted and given some training at the Police Academy. (There are roughly 257 leadership positions in the HNP.)

63. Norma Parker, "Haiti One Year Later: Achievements of Our Economic Assistance Program," testimony before the House of Representatives Subcommittee on International Affairs (Draft), October 12, 1995.

64. To borrow Fishel's classic play on Clausewitz, in John T. Fishel, *The Fog of Peace: Planning and Executing the Restoration of Panama*, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, April 15, 1992.

65. FBIS, *Daily Report: Latin America*, January 16, 1996.

66. Reportedly, Celestin is married to a relative of Aristide. Larry Rohter, "Support Is Waning for Haiti's U.S.-Trained Police," *The New York Times*, December 24, 1995.

67. Thomas W. Lippmann, "U.S. Officials Say Haitians Stymied FBI," *The Washington Post*, January 5, 1996. In Aristide's defense, it must be said that the pressures to increase the size of the HNP are considerable. This is the quickest way to beef up the institution in the face of a growing security crisis.

68. Information from LTC Robert Caslen, former executive for security affairs to the MNF and U.N. commanders in Haiti.

69. Conversation with Colonel Mark Boyatt, September 22, 1995. Nevertheless, there continues to be great concern about this possibility. There have even been claims that some U.S. Special Forces soldiers helped FAdH troops and *attaches* stash their weapons to avoid confiscation. While it is conceivable that such collaboration may have occurred in a few isolated instances, these reports have not been verified and are highly suspect. See Douglas Farah and Dana Priest, "Haiti Says U.S. Troops May Have Helped Forces," *The Washington Post*, December 8, 1995; "Special Forces Underground in Haiti," *Haiti en Marche*, November 29-December 5, 1995.

70. I am grateful to Rachel Neild for impressing this point on me.

71. Neild, *et. al.*, *Policing Haiti*, pp. 16-17; Human Rights Watch/Americas and National Coalition for Haitian Refugees, *Haiti: Security Compromised; Recycled Haitian Soldiers on Police Front Line*, Vol. VII, March 1995, pp. 7-9; Douglas Farah, "U.S. Exercises Its Influence on Aristide," *The Washington Post*, February 22, 1995.

72. According to LTC Robert Caslen, in comments on the preliminary draft of this manuscript.

73. Thomas W. Lippmann, "U.S. Accused of 'Stonewalling' on Haitian Murder," *The Washington Post*, December 23, 1995; and Lippmann, "U.S. Officials Say Haitians Stymied FBI."

74. At least 40 such cases occurred in March 1995 alone, and another 18 in July. McCoy, "Haiti," p. 20.

75. Some U.S. military intelligence sources have estimated that there have been over 80 political killings since October 1994. In contrast, the American Embassy has tried to minimize the problem, contending that only a relative handful of assassinations have been political. A few months ago, the International Civilian Mission, which monitors the human rights situation, reported that there had been 20 commando-style killings since Aristide's return. But there have been others since then. See Robert D. Novak, "A Shooting in Haiti," *The Washington Post*, October 12, 1995; Sandra Marquez, "Leaked Report Shows Internal U.S. Discord Over Haiti Policy," *Miami Herald*, August 17, 1995.

76. Robert D. Novak, "Downward Spiral in Haiti," *The Washington Post*, August 10, 1995.

77. Larry Rohter, "U.S. Suspicions Over Killing May Mar Clinton's Haiti Trip," *The New York Times*, March 31, 1995.

78. Letter of Colin Granderson, head of the OAS/U.N. International Civilian Mission in Haiti, in *The Washington Post*, November 3, 1995. The most obvious *Lavalas* casualty was Jean-Hubert Feuille, Aristide's cousin and friend. Another victim was Eric Lamothe, a member of the National Front for Change and Democracy, which supported Aristide's bid for the presidency in 1990. The most recent target (though it is unclear whether this was a political attack or a robbery attempt) was *Lavalas* legislator Harry Marsan. See "Pro-Aristide Lawmaker Is Found Shot to Death," *Miami Herald*, March 4, 1995; FBIS, *Daily Report: Latin America*, January 17, 1996. Deidre McFadyen recently reported that more than 60 Aristide supporters have been killed in the political attacks, but listed no sources. Such claims are suspect, as are the U.S. intelligence sources cited in footnote 75. See Deidre McFadyen, "The 'Violence' of Aristide," *NACLA Report on the Americas*, Vol. XXIX, January/February 1996, p. 5.

79. Conversation with Colonel Mark Boyatt, September 22, 1995. This is less true than it used to be. Originally, the police were limited to side arms. After Boyatt left, however, each station got 2 shotguns, 5 M-14s and 5 37-mm gas guns, along with pepper spray and other equipment. Information from LTC Robert Caslen.

80. This from a knowledgeable U.S. military source to the author. See also Carey, "Regime Change, Elite Change, Pragmatism, and Consensus: Political Reconciliation and Rule of Law in Occupied Haiti," p. 14.

81. In the two decades that followed, the FAdH evolved from a political mediator to a guardian and eventually a political ruler before being purged and subordinated by the Duvalier regime. See Laguerre, *The Military and Society in Haiti*, pp. 84-104.

82. This issue, like that of privatization, is very sensitive. Some nationalists and leftists are opposed to a continuing international military/police presence, recalling the 19-year U.S. occupation earlier this century. Thus Aristide, who has ambitions to recapture the presidency 5 years from now (when the constitution will allow it), chose to leave the request to Preval. He doesn't want to be remembered as the one who continued the foreign occupation of Haiti after foreigners brought him back.

83. ICITAP is the U.S. Justice Department's International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program.

84. See especially the forthcoming book, based on the papers from the Mayagüez conference, which is currently being edited by Robert Rotberg and will be published by the Brookings Institution. See also the report by Ernest H. Preeg, *The Haitian Dilemma: A Case Study in Demographics, Development and U.S. Policy*, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1996.

85. See FBIS, *Daily Report: Latin America*, January 22, 1996.

86. Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*, Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991, p. 259.

87. On the other hand, if Preval becomes too dependent on Aristide he will be viewed as a puppet. For speculation about the alleged split between the two, see Douglas Farah, "Aristide to Haiti: I'll be Around," *The Washington Post*, February 7, 1996; and Larry Rohter, "In or Out of Presidency, Aristide Is Still the Issue," *The New York Times*, February 9, 1996.

88. FBIS, *Daily Report: Latin America*, January 19, 1996; Larry Rohter, "Haitian Taking Office, With Daunting Job Ahead," *The New York Times*, February 7, 1996.

89. It should be remembered that Preval will need the support of parliament to enact many of these reforms, and that may not be easy to obtain.

90. Lippman, "U.S. Officials Say Haitians Stymied FBI."

91. On this theme, see especially Schulz and Marcella, *Reconciling the Irreconcilable*, pp. 17-49

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